Notes on hardening a home as a target.

Steps to hardening my home as a target.

1. Assess the threat.
2. Address the threat.
3. Test the threat.
4. Maintenance and Adjustments to the plan.
5. Educate your neighborhood.
6. Request for comments.

Assess the threat.

Here's a hypothetical case: You live on the ground floor, have many large windows which would easily accommodate an intruder. Worse, you have multiple doors that enter the home, and while those doors have deadbolts, they also have windows in them, and sit on jams that could easily succumb to a stiff shoulder used as a battering ram. Maybe your cars sit in your driveway, and when you are away... they are away too, easily conveying to an observer that you are not at home.

Without getting too paranoid, I was worried mainly about the safety of my family. Lead paint, asbestos and radon weren't the only fears we discovered while moving into a new home. I found it difficult to sleep at night, frequently having nightmares of someone entering my home for stuff, or a peek at my attractive wife or her unmentionables. I was less afraid of someone breaking in during the day while we were away at work and our children at school. Stuff can be replaced, or better... NOT replaced with more stuff. However, the idea that someone could enter my home while we were sleeping and through some unfortunate series of events frighten or harm my family or myself was simply intolerable. The media doesn't help, almost daily news stories about home invasions, gangs moving into the neighborhood, drug dealers and their addict patrons who in needing another hit abscond with the possessions of others for their street value, and on and on. I decided I'd study my options, and these are the notes that developed as part of that process.

Address the threat.

Again, using our hypothetical case.

1. Windows.
   1. Obscure outside to inside visibility. Basically, the objective is to prevent a would-be intruder from conducting reconnaissance. If the potential intruder cannot establish your pattern of at-home-ness, or when you retire and when you arise, what your movements through your home are like, etc., then it will be much more difficult for him to formulate an entry plan. When faced with the possibility of breaking into a home which he has 1) no idea whether there are valuables there, and 2) whether or not he's likely to face the barrel of a pistol, or the muzzle of a doberman, even the most simple of minds
2. Doors.
   1. If your doors have windows in them, you should use the same tactics from the windows section. Basically, 1) you don't want folks to be able to see in, 2) you want them to see some indication that your windows and doors are protected by a recognized alarm system brand, that your possession are cataloged and insured. This is alleged to make it more difficult to sell stolen items to a pawn shop for example, though the skeptic in me suspects this is as much a marketing ploy on the part of insurance companies to get your money as it is an effective deterrent. 3) You want them to see some indication that the window is safety glass, or in someway hardening against removal so as to suggest that even if a bold intruder decides they could break the window to unlock a door, that the process would in fact NOT be quick, that it would be excessively time consuming and noisy, and may not even be successful potentially.
   2. You want the door to appear to be metal, or at least solid wood. If the hinges happen to be on the outside, you want have opened the door, drilled 3 or 4 holes along the length of the door and added nails into the swinging part of the door which when closed go into the drilled holes. This way if the pins from the hinges are removed, the nails and their aligned receiving holes in the jam will prevent the door from being removed from the hinges. You also want the would be attacker to KNOW that this has been done so they don't bother trying to remove the door and causing damage in the process. This can be accomplished with a sticker or some writing indicating "these hinges have been augmented with security devices designed to prevent the door from being removed by defeating the hinges".
   3. You want the door to have a deadbolt, and a separate latch associated with the opening mechanism. Basically, the more hardware extruding from the door into the door jam, the more widely dispersed the impact point would be in the event a battering technique is used to break the door down. With only a single point of extrusion into the jam, the door is significantly more easy to break in. With two or more extrusions spaced apart enough to distribute the force along more of the jam, the door becomes virtually impossible to batter. If you don't use this door often, or if you are "in for the evening", you can also employ a door bracer bar which attaches at one end to the floor and the other end to the door to further absorb batter energy, almost guaranteeing that the door jam will not have a chance to fail.
   4. You want the door and the jam extrusion points to be shielded with metal. Wood splinters with enough force, but metal can take a pounding. Get a metal C-casing for the extruding hardware. This is visible to intruders and a great deterrent to their even butting the door once or twice to see if they can break in.
   5. Optimally a metal door and metal jam. These can resist even the most effective battering rams, and are almost impossible for amateur battering techniques to defeat. However, this is expensive and may not be feasible for your circumstances. Mainly its offered as a best case scenario.
3. Door Jams.
   1. Visually you want the door jam to appear impenetrable. Functionally, you want the door jam to actually be impenetrable. Hopefully the visual effect will ward off any effort to breach it, and help you avoid the vandalism that accompanies such exploratory efforts. The main weaknesses associated with jams are as follows: 1) If the deadbolt and opening extrusions can be access through the jam, they potentially can be defeated (particularly if no deadbolt exists... then it may be as simple as jimmying the door with a knife.) 2) Outward facing hinges, while these are described with the door section, this is a weakness shared equally with the jam since it requires the jam and the door both to be modified in a hardening effort. The other potential problem jams offer is partial visibility. If you have a sloppy jam, (or if there is sufficient space under the door to see through) then someone scouting could observe traffic patterns through openings between the door and the jam. Not to mention if you are heating or cooling the space behind the door, you are also doing the same for the space on the other side of a sloppy door or jam and wasting money and energy unnecessarily.
4. Perceptions.
   1. Don't look like you have something valuable. This doesn't mean you need to drive junkers or wear sack cloth, but it does mean you shouldn't parade around in a Ferrari, wearing a Rolex and touting wads of cash or jewelry. At the risk of being misperceived of being sexist, it also means that (since most thieves are heterosexual males) you should not parade around your female better half in a bikini, short skirt, or with a thong hanging out the back of her pants. It's probably less of an issue outside of your neighborhood, such as at a mall, party, or whatever. Basically, you just don't want voyeurs and perverts following you home and marking you as a target for intrusion which could take on a far more sinister twist of events.
   2. Illness. If a potential attacker thinks there's a risk of catching a disease, that's a definite deterrent. When coupled with the perception that there's nothing valuable at your location, these combine to form a powerful case against burglary or intrusion for any purpose. It may also imply a negative stigma with your neighbors, but like the volume on your IPod, you just need to decide "how much" of the one vs. how much of the other you can tolerate to get a balance that deters intruders but doesn't make you the neighborhood leper.
   3. A dog. This one is an oldie but a goodie. You don't really need a dog, but let's consider two angles. First, you own a dog. Second, you appear to own a dog. If you actually own a dog, an intruder, upon intrusion will likely cause your dog to start barking. If your dog has a loud bark, this is a powerful deterrent to further intrusion. Upon hearing the barking, the intruder will realize that you are likely forewarned, and that the neighbors may well consider investigating the noise if even only out of annoyance. If you own a dog, but don't make it apparent to someone scouting your home as a potential target, you are missing out on another great deterrent. Even if you don't actually own a dog, appearing to own a dog may cause a would-be criminal to consider that your "dog" will begin barking and drawing a lot of unwanted attention before they gain access and have an opportunity to look for valuables. If the burglar doesn't know if, or where you store your valuables, the idea of a barking dog eliminates an search time he might have. Combined with other tactics, this is a really effective move and could easily cause a would-be intruder to pass you up in favor of a softer target.
   4. A gun, martial arts, or the threat of harm. This one is a dangerous and debatable tactic. I've heard compelling arguments suggesting that folks who keep a gun in the house are just as likely to have the tables turned and their own gun used against them as they are to effectively use it in stopping an intruder. That said, waking up in the middle of the night after hearing footsteps in the house and realizing you have nothing but your own fighting skills to ward off an intruder that may have a gun is a frightening event.

Test the threat.

This one can be a little tricky. You need an associate who is both devious and trustworthy. You want someone to try to defeat your security, but in a friendly way. Immediate and extended family members are often the best candidate pool, friends secondly. Your objective on this front is to test these fronts.

1. Perceptions. Do the testers see and understand the visual tactics you've employed. For example, if you put a dog bowl and food by a doorway, does the tester see if and realize what the implication is? Does it seem amateurish? For example, if the dog bowl says "spike", or "killer", these names might seem cartoonish or fake. If the dog bowl is empty, or too clean, it may be obvious that it hasn't been used. Put some food in it, scratch it up, lick it, or put something in it that will take on an organic smell suggestive of an active pet. You might consider a chewed doggy bone, or something that shouts "used".
2. Functionality of tactics. For example, does the alarm really work. Do the motion sensors detect the appropriate level of movement or heat change, does the on-demand illumination shed sufficient luminance to reveal an intruder in the act? If your system has reporting capabilities, do the events get logged and can you access and assess them effectively to identify intrusion efforts? Does any window film designed to obscure inward visibility actual accomplish it's goal or can you see in still? Is a peeper noticeable when pressed against the window? Are there plants or anything else that could be used to permit an observer to conceal himself behind?

The best thing about employing someone else in defeating your efforts is perspective. The more "eyeballs" on a tactical element, the better representation of reality you'll get. What you might well skim over or rationalize, not-you observers will often catch and reveal with ease.

Maintenance and Adjustments to the plan.

Based on the testing efforts, you may need to implement additional elements, or correct poorly executed tactics. Also, many of your elements may employ batteries, wiring, light bulbs, wireless connections which rely on functional senders and receivers. You need to create a simple, rememberable, sustainable testing schedule. It needs to go on your honey-do's just like mowing the lawn, or taking out the trash. The intervals necessary to keep a system running may require a monthly or semi-annual frequency. If you can simplify your test plan, running through the interval checks you good pretty fast, lending to it's sustainability and insuring you'll actually stick to the maintenance routine.

Educate your neighborhood.

1. First, why? If you want to obscure your tactics in hardening yourself as a potential target, you may not want to divulge anything about your approach so as not to minimize the efficacy of your efforts. However, consider that if an intruder abandons your home in favor of your neighbors home, the crime rate will go up, and your property value will go down. Worse, crime seems to have a magnetic effect. Once a criminal is successful, they often return since your neighborhood is a known commodity. In gaining comfort operating in your neighborhood, their surveillance tactics may well improve and your hardening may become a thin facade under improved scrutiny.
2. So, what to do? Well, without revealing the specifics of your implementation, you may want to suggest a neutral resource (such as this one) to your neighbors in order to educate them on methods of hardening themselves as targets. You also want to facilitate social activities with your neighbors. Doing this allows you to gauge the threat your neighbors may represent either directly, or indirectly. Indirectly you ask? Consider that if your neighbor flashes a lot of cash and drives a BMW, he or she may well be attracting the wrong kind of attention for your neighborhood. Once a bad guy is drawn into assessing your neighbor, what's to prevent them from targeting you instead? Organizing a neutral cookout, or block party in a common area (preferably not inside your home, but in your yard is fine, especially if you have the ulterior motive of casually revealing your dog house, dog bowl, the presence of an alarm system, deadbolts, hardened doors, intrusion resistant windows, or whatever visible strategic elements you've employed in order to simply make a trusted assailant aware that your location is not worth attacking.) Organizing or participating in a social event such as this will help you make friends with neighbors and probably enrich your experience living in the neighborhood, as well as that of your neighbors. You can also take note of anyone that seems "off", or of non-participants. Building a relationship with neighbors helps you reduce the trusted threat pool by eliminating potential intruders based on a personal relationship. We all get a sense of the general decency of folks we interact with, and while some minuscule percentage of those folks could be pretenders, the opportunity to expose them to the deliberately visible precautions you've taken silently educates them to avoid you as a potential target.
3. Neighborhood watch. While the signs are almost cliché, crime watch can be effective. As you build relationships of trust, having an effective coverage of neighborhood watch coupled with a mechanism for communication can be a helpful deterrent. If neighbors walk around in their neighborhood, appear to be observant, report suspicious behavior to alert their cohorts to potential or developing threats, and passively intervene during the process of surveillance, they can virtually shut down criminals. The whole neighborhood gains hardening points, and everybody benefits not only from prevention, but from developing friendships, social opportunities, and exercise!

Request for comments

Feedback. These notes and experiences stemmed from my own efforts and research. I'd love to hear stories of successes and/or misses so we know what to watch out for. Please validate, invalidate, expand, or correct this information as you see fit. I can't promise anything, but I'll do my best. Thanks for any and all input. You can contact the author here.

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